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LEVERAGE,  PROFITABILITY AND THE 
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES OF L ISTED 
FIRMS IN CHINA  
 
Abstract 
The relationship between leverage, profitability and a firm’s ownership structure in China 
is investigated in this paper. It is an exploratory study based on all firms listed on the Shanghai 
and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 1999 to 2005. The results of the empirical analysis are 
reported in this paper.  
The most significant result is that foreign holdings are found to have a significant 
relationship with the leverage of listed firms in China. Whereas, somewhat unexpectedly, 
institutional ownership, through legal person holding companies, state ownership and private 
holdings are not found to have a significant relationship with the capital structure choices of firms 
in China. The results also suggest that some firm-specific factors that are relevant for explaining 
firm leverage generally referred to in studies in developed economies, such as profitability, 
growth opportunities, size and tax shields, are also relevant in China. The age of the firms and the 
industry to which they principally belong also has significant bearing. Yet direct government 
grants and the use of an internationally renowned auditing firm do not show a significant 
relationship. 
Keywords: State-owned enterprises, Ownership structures, Capital Structure, Emerging 
markets, China. 
JEL classifications : P31, L33, G32, G38, O53. 
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1. Introduction 
The relationship between leverage, profitability and a firm’s ownership structure is 
investigated in this paper. It is an exploratory empirical analysis of all firms listed on the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 1999 to 2005. The results of the analysis are 
reported in this paper.  
China has experienced outstanding growth as the economic, market and corporate reforms, 
which began in the late 1970s, gain momentum. The reforms have been an important aspect of 
the outstanding economic growth which has been accomplished as China moves towards a 
“socialist market economy”. In the corporate sector the majority of small and medium, and many 
large, former SOEs, have been privatised or partially privatised.  
A focus of this paper is on the interesting ownership mix of the listed firms in China. The 
greatest proportion of these have ownership of state at an average of about 40%, legal person 
institutional at around 20%, private at 30%, and foreign holdings at 3%1. There are also a limited 
number of management and employee holdings in some firms. Firms may also have other 
institutional investors, both domestic and foreign. Adding to the complexity, some holdings are 
nontradable, such as state and legal person holdings, and the rest are tradable. However, some 
shares (B-Shares) are only tradable in the B-Share market to a select group of investors - to 
foreign investors or domestic investors with foreign currency assets. These diverse holdings make 
for a study of how these ownership structures influence the profitability and capital structure, in 
this case specifically the leverage, of listed firms in China. 
                                                 
1 See Figure 1. These are discussed in greater detail later in the paper. 
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The consequence of the capital structure, ownership structure and profitability of China’s 
many and often immense state-owned enterprises (SOEs) will be considerable, especially as the 
country’s progress on the road to a “socialist market economy”.gains momentum. SOEs play a 
central role in that they supply crucial raw materials, and are “pillars” in important large, capital-
intensive industries, such as power, steel, machinery and chemicals. Therefore, the success of 
SOE reform is a significant factor in China’s future economic prosperity and ability to contend 
with mounting social justice issues.  
The capital structure literature has focussed on the theoretical models explaining capital 
structure and empirically testing these models. Over the years, this has fundamentally focussed 
on large corporations which have publicly traded equity and debt in developed economies (for 
example see Allayannis, Brown, & Klapper, 2003; Baker & Wurgler, 2002; Berger & Bonaccorsi 
di Patti, 2006; Bevan & Danbolt, 2004; Brounen, De Jong, & Koedijk, 2006; DeAngelo & 
Masulis, 1980; Desai, Foley, & Hines, 2004; Fischer, Heinkel, & Zechner, 1989; Hovakimian, 
2006; Kale, Noe, & Ramirez, 1991; Kayhan & Titman, 2007; Miao, 2005; Rajan & Zingales, 
1995; Ross, 2005; Wald, 1999a). Studies have also been undertaken in developing and 
transitional economies more recently. For example, in a study of developing countries (Booth et 
al., 2001), of Central and Eastern European economies (de Haas & Peeters, 2006), a study of the 
effect of political patronage in Malaysia (Fraser, Zhang, & Derashid, 2006), a study of capital 
structure in Pakistan (Hijazi & Tariq, 2006), and the influence of the chaebol in South Korea 
(Kim, Heshmati, & Aoun, 2006). There have also been a few studies focusing on various issues 
of the capital structure of listed firms in China (Huang & Song, 2006; Tong & Green, 2005; 
Zhang, Zhang, & Zhao, 2002). Thus, there is just a narrow range of literature and research aimed 
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at furthering our understanding of capital structures in developing and transitional economies that 
often have unique institutional structures. 
Thus, the relation between leverage, performance and a firm’s ownership structure are 
investigated in this paper. Other factors investigated are growth opportunities, size and age of the 
firm, dividend/bonus payment, tax shields, tangibility, and the industry to which they principally 
belong. Other aspects not previously included in studies of China are direct government grants 
indicating direct state support, the use of internationally renowned “Big Six” auditing firms and a 
corporate governance dummy variable if the Chair and President is the same person.  
The study is based on all firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 
1999 to 2005. Thus, the study is based on more recent data than earlier studies in China. This is 
an important distinction in the context of China as the environment is changing significantly over 
time - the market is maturing, the free market economy is evolving and political involvement in 
listed firms is diminishing over time.  
The results are that leverage has a significant negative relationship with profitability. It 
also suggests that some firm-specific factors that are relevant for explaining firm leverage 
generally referred to in studies in developed economies, such as, growth opportunities, size and 
tax shields, are also relevant in China. A very important result is that foreign holdings are found 
to have a significant relationship with the leverage of listed firms in China. Whereas, somewhat 
unexpectedly, institutional ownership, through legal person holding companies, state ownership 
and private holdings are not found to have a significant relationship with the capital structure 
choices of firms in China. The age of the firms and the industry to which they principally belong 
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also has significant bearing. Yet direct government grants and the use of an internationally 
renowned auditing firm do not show a significant relationship. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 is a short discussion of SOE 
ownership in China. Section 3 discusses the data. Sections 4 and 5 discuss the performance and 
ownership structure study and the descriptive statistics. Sections 6 present the empirical results 
on SOE performance changes and the relationship between ownership mix and firm performance 
and Section 7 concludes the paper. 
2. SOE Ownership in China 
A commitment was made in 1997 to an immense privatization program of the estimated 
308,000 (Morrison, 1999) SOEs. The slogan of the program was zhuada fangxiao, meaning 
“protect the large, release the small” (Hong Kong Economic Journal, September 19, 1997, Ho, 
Bowles, & Dong, 2003). This policy is directed at both concentrating reform energy on 1,000 or 
so of the largest enterprises, many of which are “pillar industries,” and toward escalating the 
privatization of numerous small and selected medium SOEs. Through this scheme, vast numbers 
of small and medium sized SOEs are being merged, sold or allowed to embark on joint venture 
partnerships. It has resulted in a privatization program of unparalleled proportions. However, the 
extent of reforms varies considerably. Whilst many smaller SOEs have been privatized, typically 
large SOEs remain firmly within the control of the state. The bulk of China’s SOEs are now 
structured as corporations and more than 1,000 enterprises have raised additional capital by 
issuing new shares to outside shareholders by listing on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges. Thus, ownership structures are a key consideration of enterprise reforms in China. 
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In China, a typical listed firm has a combination of major owners. Ownership structure is 
typically made up of three primary groups of shareholders – the state, legal persons, and domestic 
individual investors. Foreign holdings also feature as do employee and offshore shares that are 
offered by a small number of firms but  typically represent only low levels of ownership. In brief, 
state shares are generally classified as those held by one of the various levels of government, state 
agents or by SOEs. These are held by the state and state-owned holding companies on behalf of 
the state. There are three forms of state backed ownership – “direct”, “state shares” and “legal 
persons.” Generically the first two are simply classified as “state shares” and the last as “legal 
person” shares.  
In the majority of instances state ownership is classified as “state shares” in the data and 
literature and refers to state ownership which is typically held through state entities other than 
legal persons. These entities are often SOEs or bodies controlled by various levels of government. 
The third category mentioned above is legal person ownership. Legal person ownership is state 
equity held by state domestic institutions or holding firms. These are principally autonomous ly 
managed investment institutions that are primarily state-owned government agencies (Gul & 
Zhao, 2001; Xu & Wang, 1997). Therefore, the ownership structure is a form of pyramid 
holdings, in this case, primarily by the state (Watanabe, 2002). None of these holdings can be 
publicly traded. They are thus often classified as “non-tradeable A-shares.” However, they have 
the same dividend rights and voting rights as other shares. These various classifications make the 
data difficult to work with, as both “state shares” and legal person ownership are classified as “A-
shares” in the Taiwan Economic Journal data used in this study. 2 
                                                 
2 This is all very confusing at first and takes some unravelling in building the datasets for the study. 
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There are two forms of tradeable shares - “A” and “B” shares. Tradeable A-shares, are 
typically simply called “A-shares,” despite the existence of non-tradable A-shares as mentioned 
above. “A-shares” are ordinary shares with voting rights of one-share-one-vote and the same 
dividend rights as other shares. They are traded domestically by primarily domestic individual 
investors on Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. Only Chinese citizens, a few domestic 
institutions and a handful of approved foreign institutions can hold them or trade them - the 
market has opened to large foreign institutions that are required to follow strict guidelines 
(Buckley, 2003). “B-shares” are tradeable on the B-share market and denominated in foreign 
currency: U.S. dollars in Shanghai and Hong Kong dollars in Shenzhen. B-shares have 
traditionally been held principally by foreign investors and a small number of domestic securities 
firms with special permission to hold them. The B-share market has now been opened up for 
trading by domestic Chinese with funds from offshore accounts. As a rule, in the order of only 
one third of the shares of the typical firm are tradeable and held by individual investors (see 
Figure 2). 
Employee shares are collectively held by employees of a firm and are usually issued at a 
discount before the firm goes public (Chen & Gong, 2000). At the time of listing, they are non-
tradable shares, although they can be converted into tradable A-shares 3 years after listing, with 
approval from the authorities. Typically, employee shares are not a performance incentive, but  
are compensation for past association with a firm. On average, they account for a small 
percentage of firm ownership (see Figure 2). 
Cross-listed holdings are held in a number of international exchanges such as Hong Kong, 
New York, Japan, London, Frankfurt and other European exchanges. Most common are “H” and 
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“N” shares which are listed in Hong Kong or New York respectively. Cross- listing in Singapore 
(“S” shares) are also relatively common. Red Chips’ are stocks issued by Hong Kong firms that 
receive substantial backing from Chinese institutions. ‘China Plays’ are Taiwan and Hong Kong 
firms, listed on home exchanges, but that have substantial business interests in China. There are 
presently fourteen Chinese firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), however, 
interestingly, not all of these are listed on the domestic exchanges in China. Some firms are also 
listed on other foreign stock exchanges. For example, China Eastern Airlines Corporation Ltd is 
listed on the Berlin, Frankfurt, Hong Kong, Munich, New York, Stuttgart, XETRA Electronic 
Trading and Shanghai stock exchanges (Hovey & Hovey, 2004). 
Figure 1 below depicts the average holdings of listed firms in China for all the years 
1999-2005. As can be observed State held an average of 41.28% of equity in listed firms in China 
during this period, whereas LP holdings were 19.43%. Thus overall the state had a significant 
influence, if not control, of an average of 60.71% holdings during this period - this could readily 
be classified as a supermajority interest. Private ownership was made up of Public Shares at an 
average of 30.45% and Foreign Shares at just 3.17%. Therefore, even though these are partially 
privatised firms, the average private holdings were just 33.62% during this period. 
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Figure 1: Average Holdings (%) 1997-2005 
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Data Source: TEJ (2006). 
Note: The balance = Other Founder, Preferred and Employee shares. 
 
Figure 2 shows the year-by-year break up of the average ownership structure of listed 
firms in China for each for the years 1999-2005. As can be observed, interestingly state holdings 
have increased overall from 40.2% to 42.3%. LP holdings were at their lowest at 18.8% in 2002 
and at their peak of 20.1% in 2003, but have declined back to 19.6% in 2005. Private holdings 
(Public) have actually decreased from 33.1% in 1999 to 27.9% in 2005, whilst, Foreign holdings 
have increased from 1.3% in 1999 to 5.3% in 2005. 
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Figure 2 Ownership Structure 1997-2004 Year-by-Year Averages (%)  
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Data Source: TEJ (2006). 
Note: The balance = Other Founder, Preferred and Employee shares. 
 
3. Data 
The study is based on a dataset compiled from the Taiwan Economic Journal (henceforth 
TEJ) Greater China Database of firms listed on both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges 
from 1999 to 2005. Thus, the study is based on more recent data than earlier studies in China. 
Financial institutions are not included in this study. The market values, accounting and ownership 
data used in this research is obtained from various TEJ databases for China and is used in the 
valuation of all shares, consistent with prior studies. The industrial classifications were sourced 
separately.  
In all, the pooled dataset is made up of a total of 6,222 observations. The availability of 
financial data is used as a basis for the selection as to which firms are included in the dataset. 
Some data are missing for some firms, thus when the model is run these firms are dropped. The 
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results show the number of observations in each case. On average each run consisted of 1,673 
observations, given the lack of data for dividends. 
One of the problems faced in the study of enterprises of China is that the publicly 
available data is restricted to the relatively few listed firms. Furthermore, perhaps better-managed 
firms comply with disclosure requirements and submit timely reports and thus their data is 
available. Therefore, the sample may not be truly representative and thus it is acknowledged that 
the study suffers from a data selection bias. 
4. The Empirical Analysis 
In this analysis, the linkage between the leverage, ownership structure and firm 
profitability is investigated. If profitability is irrelevant, it would be expected to be insignificant 
in regressions on leverage. If ownership structure is irrelevant, the percentage of holdings of each 
category of ownership would be expected to be insignificant in regressions on leverage. 
Regression analysis is used to examine the relative importance of ownership mix and structure in 
predicting the financial performance of listed enterprises in China tested by estimating the 
following equation: 
ebbbbb
bbbbbbba
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Where:  
LEV  =  The leverage of the firm taken as the total debt to equity ratio. 
EO = The equity ownership fraction of State Shares, Legal Person Shares, Public 
Shares and Foreign Shares.  
ROA  =  The return on assets applying the EBIT/total assets model. 
SIZE = Size is taken as the natural log of the market value.  
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GRTH  =  Growth potential taken as the market to book value ratio.  
TAX = The tax shield – the proxy used in this study is the tax deduction for 
depreciation over total assets. 
Tang  =  Tangibility - the proxy used in this study is tangible assets over total assets. 
DIV  =  Dividend - the proxy used in this study is dividend and bonus payments over 
gross profits. 
AGE  = Total age of the firm taken as number of years the firm has been in operation.  
GRANT = Government Grants scaled by total assets. 
CH_PR = A dummy variable taken as 1 if the Chairman and President are the same 
person and 0 if they are not. 
AUDT = A dummy variable taken as 1 if the auditing firm used is a “Big Six” 
international accounting firm. 
INDD = Twenty-one industry control variables.  
        a  =  the intercept, b  = the regression coefficients; and e = the error term.  
 
Employing the data for all listed companies 1999-2005 with available data, a series of 
linear regressions are run as well as an unbalanced panel data set. The detail of these variables is 
provided below.  
4.1 Leverage 
In the regressions, the dependent variable is financial leverage (LEV), which is the debt to 
equity ratio of each firm as measured by the book value of total debt divided by the equity. 
Consistent with the risk associated with higher levels of debt and with pecking order theory, debt 
is typically negatively correlated to the profitability of the firm. However, the “policy lending” 
regime during this period in China (Park & Sehrt, 2001) may give rise to higher levels of debt 
having quite a differently effect. In China, higher leverage may imply the availability of state 
funding for corporate operations (Chow & Fung, 1998).  
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After listing, obviously SOEs have access to private equity. Thus their leverage would be 
expected to decrease compared to prior to listing. As SOEs did not have access to private equity 
prior to listing, the only source of funds apart from government grants, were borrowings from the 
state owned banks. Thus SOEs had a high level of leverage. Furthermore, the cost of debt was 
low as they borrowed from state owned banks and had either implicit or explicit government 
guarantees. Adding to this, often SOEs did not expect to repay the loans leading to a high 
proportion of non-performing loans for the state owned banks (Hovey, 2001). Typically, SOEs 
had low or negative profitability (Aivazian, Ge, & Qiu, 2005; Cull & Xu, 2005), thus retained 
earnings were not generally available.  
However, in China debt levels would be expected to remain high even after listing 
because of the quota system for listing which continued until February 2000. The quota system 
limited the amount of capital allowed to be raised, as well as limiting the number of firms that 
could list publicly. The government placed a quota on the of capital raised by IPOs nationally 
each year, which was administered by provincial governments which typically allocate the quota 
to firms based on various criteria, some listed poorly performing firms, preventing individual 
SOEs from raising as much equity capital as needed (Neoh, 1999). 
Even though the quota system has been removed, still firms cannot raise all the capital 
they require at IPO and often have to rely on other sources of funds. They also typically raise 
further funds through rights issues after IPO (Chen & Yuan, 2004; Wang, Wei, & Pruitt, 2006). 
All in all, debt, especially Bank loans, is still a significant and necessary source of capital.  
The pressure on capital allocations is also increased as often unprofitable SOEs have been 
encouraged to merge with, or be acquired by, profitable SOEs (Cooper & Zheng, 1998; Dirkis, 
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1998). During a restructure, better performing SOEs may be merged with poorly performing 
SOEs to save that SOE, to the detriment of the better performing SOE.  
4.2 Equity Ownership 
Equity ownership (EO) is the average percentage holdings by the various categories of 
ownership. Specifically, it is the equity ownership fraction of State Shares, Legal Person Shares, 
Public Shares and Foreign Shares. As state ownership and LP ownership are highly correlated, at 
-84.98%, the regressions are run separately for them. State ownership has been found to be 
negatively correlated to performance in the literature (Hovey & Naughton, 2007) (see for 
example, Chen & Gong, 2000; Gul & Zhao, 2001; Hovey, Li, & Naughton, 2003; Wei & Varela, 
2003; Xu & Wang, 1999) , however the influence of state holdings on leverage is unknown. It is 
expected to be negative as the higher the state ownership, the less availability to equity capital 
and the higher level of implied guarantee. Prior research on legal person holdings suggests that 
LP ownership is positively correlated with performance (Hovey & Naughton, 2007) (see for 
example, Chen & Gong, 2000; Gul & Zhao, 2001; Hovey et al., 2003; Xu & Wang, 1999), 
however the influence of state holdings on leverage is unknown. Public Shares is equity 
ownership of publicly held tradable A-shares. The higher the leve l of publicly held equity the less 
the requirement for debt, thus it is expected to reduce the reliance on debt. However, the 
supermajority ownership of the state and low levels of individual holdings may reduce any effect. 
Foreign Shares is the total of foreign individual and institution holdings. Chhibber and Majumdar 
(1999) found that foreign ownership at concentrations of 51 percent or higher has a positive 
influence on performance in India. However, the effect on debt is unknown, but again is expected 
to reduce the reliance on debt.  
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In China, the percentage of shares held by employees, managers, directors and 
supervisory board members is relatively insignificant. Accordingly, it is considered that their 
overall influence is inconsequential. Hence, they are not included in the analysis. Support for this 
comes from Gul and Zhao (2001) who found that the percentage of shares held by directors and 
supervisory board members are not significant in regressions of firm performance in China.  
4.3 Profitability 
In the regressions, the profitability instrument that is applied is return on assets (ROA), 
which is an independent variable. The return on assets is applied is the EBIT over total assets 
model, rather than the typical net income over over total assets. As EBIT represents operating 
profit, EBIT over total assets should give a better estimate of performance regardless of the 
leverage or any favored tax treatment. 
A number of empirical studies have been conducted studying the relationship between 
leverage and profitability. For example, leverage is found to be negatively correlated with 
profitability in both the US and Japan (Kester & Kolb, 1991), in developed economies (see for 
example Bevan & Danbolt, 2004; Rajan & Zingales, 1995), and in developing economies (see for 
example Booth et al., 2001; Fraser et al., 2006). Studies so far in China find a negative 
correlation between leverage and profitability (Huang & Song, 2006; Tong & Green, 2005; 
Zhang et al., 2002). Never the less, in China, it is possible that the higher the proportion of state 
holdings to debt, being an indication of state capital assistance via policy lending, which is an 
indicator of state benevolence and support, and a reduced cost of debt and the opportunity for 
higher firm performance (Chen & Gong, 2000). Despite this possibility, it is expected that a 
negative correlation between leverage and profitability will be found. 
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4.4 Size  
The next independent variable applied is firm SIZE which controls for the size effect. 
Fama and French (1995), found that size is a factor in the returns of a firm. In the case of China, 
bigger SOEs have potentially greater government control and evoke more bureaucracy and 
agency problems, and increased redundancy.  
By and large, empirical studies in developed economies have found leverage to be 
positively related to company size (see for example Booth et al., 2001; Rajan & Zingales, 1995; 
Wald, 1999a; Wald, 1999b). In a study of firms in China, Huang and Song (Huang & Song, 2006) 
found that leverage increases with size.  
While there are many different proxies for size, in this study, the natural logarithm of 
market value of the firm is used. 
4.5 Growth 
Growth represents the growth opportunities of a firm. Generally, empirical studies in 
developed economies have found leverage to be positively related to company growth 
opportunities (see for example Booth et al., 2001; Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Smith & Watts, 1992; 
Wald, 1999a; Wald, 1999b). 
While there are many different proxies for growth opportunities, this study follows Booth 
et al. (2001) and others and use the market-to-book ratio of equity to proxy for future growth 
opportunities.  
4.6 Tax Shield 
Tax or more precisely tax shields, represents the non-debt tax shields for the firm. The 
proxy used in this study is the tax deduction for depreciation over total assets. It is suggested that 
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tax shields are a proxy for the tax benefits that debt financing provides (DeAngelo & Masulis, 
1980). Thus, a firm with a greater proportion of tax shields is predicted to employ less debt. The 
ratio of depreciation to total assets is applied by Wald (1999), and this study follows this and uses 
depreciation over total assets to represent tax shields, and following previous studies, expect to 
find that leverage is negatively correlated with tax shields. 
4.7 Tangible assets 
The variable Tangible Assets represents the tangibility of the firm and tests the 
relationship between tangibility and leverage. The proxy used in this study is tangible assets over 
total assets. It is suggested in the literature that tangibility should be correlated positively to 
capital structure (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Generally, empirical studies in developed 
economies have found leverage to be positively related to tangibility (see for example Rajan & 
Zingales, 1995; Wald, 1999a; Wald, 1999b). It is unknown as to how this relationship will be 
played out in China, however tangibility is expected to have a similar relationship.  
4.8 Dividend  
The variable Dividend represents the dividend and bonus payments of the firm and tests 
the relationship between leverage and dividends and bonuses. Following Fama and French (2002), 
the proxy used in this study is dividend and bonus payments data, as provided by TEJ, over total 
assets.  
The literature suggests that firms with higher investments have long-term dividend 
payouts that are lower (Fama & French, 2002). According to the agency theory, dividends and 
debt may control perquisite consumption by management arising from free cash flow. How this 
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impacts on the situation in China is not clear, however higher dividends payments are expected to 
be correlated negatively with leverage. 
4.9 Age  
Age represents the total age of firm taken as number of years the firm has been in 
operation. The variable follows Zou and Xiao (2006) who suggest that the age of the firm may 
influence its leverage in China. 
4.10 Government Grants 
The variable grant is Government Grants scaled by total assets and is included to test the 
significance of Government Grants and thus direct state support on the leverage of listed firms in 
China. The sign is expected to be negative as the more state support is provided the less the 
reliance on debt capital.  
4.11 Chairman and President  
The variable Chairman and President is a dummy variable taken as 1 if the Chairman and 
President are the same person and 0 if they are not. In the corporate governance literature if the 
chairman and president’s positions are not separated, it is an indication of relatively poorer 
corporate governance and thus impact on the performance of a firm (Palmon & Wald, 2002). In 
this study it is included to determine if there is any relationship with the leverage of a firm in 
China. 
4.12 Auditing Firm  
Consistent with agency theory and the monitoring of firms, prior studies have found a 
relationship between high quality auditing firms, leverage and audit committee activity (Collier & 
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Gregory, 1999). In this study it is a dummy variable taken as 1 if the accounting firm used is a 
high quality “Big Six” international auditing firm.  
4.13 Industry  
The industry variable is included to control for the industry in which the firm is involved. 
Lindenberg and Ross (1981), suggest that the industrial organization has a significant bearing 
upon the performance of firms because they are affected by similar economic and business 
conditions and risks. In all, there are 21 similar industries observed (see the list provided under 
Descriptive Statistics, Table 2). 
5. Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1 below. As observed, there is a wide 
variation in leverage, the maximum being 200,261.50 and a minimum of -8,754.55. Of the 
independent variables, State Shares averaged 41.28%, Legal Person Shares averaged 19.43, 
Public Shares averaged 30.45 and Foreign Shares 3.17%.  
Tax Shield and Government Grants over Assets had the lowest standard deviation 
whereas Leverage was exceptionally high and Dividends and Bonus Payment over Assets was 
also high.  
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev. 
 Obser- 
vations 
Leverage 136.83 48.64 200,261.50 -8,754.55 3,027.85 6204 
State Shares (%) 41.28 45.38 100.00 0.00 25.94 6220 
Legal person Shares (%) 19.43 10.76 100.00 0.00 22.71 6220 
Public Shares (%) 30.45 30.32 100.00 0.00 15.42 6220 
Foreign Shares (%) 3.17 0.00 99.00 0.00 9.55 6220 
ROA-EBIT 2.12 3.19 51.17 -215.96 10.85 6204 
Growth (MBV) 0.65 0.31 40.93 0.03 1.05 6204 
Size 13.05 12.83 18.43 10.84 1.12 6220 
